Introduction
A purpose of formal studies of natural languages consists in answering the question as to what objects are. Recently, this question has become actual, after the research on plural and mass terms flourished (cf. Lonning (1997) , Link (1998) ). (1) There is an ontology based on individuals that considers only singular terms as constant symbols. This simple view, which I call ontology based on individuals, seems accepted implicitly in some discussions in analytical philosophy, but these discussions often ignore how to analyze complicated sentences that contain plural or mass terms. This paper proposes an alternative view, i.e. ontology based on mereology.
Frege and Russell were quite aware of problems with plural terms; actually, Frege used second-order logic that can express and characterize relations between plural objects. Lesniewski started with the study of mereology based on his own logical system, called protothetic, and his axiom of ontology. Leonard and Goodman (1940) proposed a first-order theory for mereology. Link (1983) gave an algebraic theory for mereology.
As Simons (1987) suggests, all these mereological systems do not show any fundamental difference; they are more or less varied presentations of the same idea. A mereological system can be used to treat mass terms. But, what about plural terms? In this paper, I propose how to deal with singular and plural terms based on a mereological system. Its central thesis states that objects are individuated by sortal predicates:
(1) A thesis of nomilalistic ontology of natural languages (a) All things are made of materials and materials can be referred to by using mass terms. Water and iron are examples of materials.
(b) The part-whole relation is applicable to any materials. (c) To pick up structured entities made of materials, predicates can be used. These predicates are called sortal predicates; "animal", "cell", "car", etc. are sortal predicates.
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The aim of this paper is a construction of a unified dynamic semantics for natural languages. To realize this aim, I start from an analysis of part-whole relation. The part-whole relation is a fundamental relation and can be used as a basis for definition of other relations. I will show, then, how to combine this analysis with a description of anaphoric relations.
There is an apparent grammatical continuity between singular and plural terms, and this suggests a semantical continuity between them. For example, not only singular terms but also plural terms are used for reference; certain objects can be referred to by using a plural term like "these students". Anaphoric relations are also used for plural terms, as the following example shows: "Some students are talking in a cafeteria. They did not go to the lecture of Prof. N". Anaphoric relations are also used for mass terms. As these considerations show, plural and mass terms refer to certain objects, as singular terms do. To accept this principle means to accept mereological ontology. 
MA2. Additional axioms for Boolean algebra 
cdF(x) expresses the cardinality of x with respect to F. It is important to relativize the notion of cardinality by a sortal predicate.
Consider the following situation. b is a sum of people consisting of 5 groups, where each group has 6 members; b includes, then, 30 people. This situation can be described within NRL: (3) No. 4
Merological
Ontology and Dynamic Semantics 33 2.3 Problems of individuation Link (1998) describes one of the most developed formal systems of mereology, the Logic of Plurality (LP). The fundamental difference between NRL and LP consists in the treatment of individuation. LP has a unary predicate symbol At that stands for "is an atom". Individuation in LP is absolute, whereas individua tion in NRL is relativized by sortal predicates. Without individuation, counting is impossible. However, counting presupposes sortal predicates.
It is somehow difficult to give an answer to the question "How many objects are there in this room?", because we do not know exactly, in this context, what we should consider as objects. Normal questions have the form "How many F-s are there in this room?", where F is a common noun, like "desk", based on a sortal predicate. Russell (1903) drew the distinction between classes as one and classes as many:
"Thus classes would seem to be one in one sense and many in another . There is a certain temptation to identify the class as many with the class as one, e. g. all men and the human race. Nevertheless, wherever a class consists of more than one term, it can be proved that no such identification is permissible." (p.
76)
Link (1998) discusses this problem in Chapter 13, but I think that LP is also faced with Russell's problem. In NRL, these two terms refer to HUMAN that is the sum of all humans. HUMAN contains many humans, but as a species, it is one. This is expressed in NRL: (cdhuman(HUMAN)>1), cdspecies(HUMAN)=1). Because LP does not respect sortal predicates, LP can count only atomic objects. In LP, HUMAN can be considered only as the fusion of many atomic objects, where it is not clear, if atomic objects are humans, cells, or molecules, because all these can be seen in some contexts as atomic.
Link treats numerals as a kind of adjective. At first sight, it seems that Russell's problem is overcome by this treatment, but this is not the case. Consider the following example: 
Things and materials
In this section, NRL is applied to analyze the relationship between mereological objects and natural languages. The following thesis indicates the starting point of this analysis.
(4)
For materials, we can take several methods of individuation. For things, however, only particular methods of individuation are given. This is because things exist after individuation by using sortal predicates, whereas materials are already given and they need no individuation. Iida (1998) studies Japanese classifiers and points out that individuative terms can be connected only with particular classifiers, whereas mass terms can be used together with various classifiers (cf. p. 5). Iida's observations suggest that thesis (4) holds not only for European languages but also for Japanese. 
Higher order individuation
In set theory, higher order objects can be created, when a set of objects is given (cf. Lonning (1997) p. 1041). In our mereological ontology, higher order objects indicate only a different individuation and they are not new objects. Only materials exist; sums of materials are simultaneously given, when materials are given. Things and higher order entities show only different kinds of grouping of these materials. Think about the sentence "GG is a group of groups that consists of two student groups G1 and G2, where each group has 20 members." This sentence is expressed within NRL: As Nakayama (1998a) states, the hearer H tries to understand what the speaker S intended to convey; in cases of utterances of indicative sentences, S intends to convey his beliefs. By uttering a sentence, S usually cannot express everything that he wanted to convey. Generally, S's belief system is presupposed and a part of it becomes needed to interpret what S wanted to convey. This part of S's belief system that is needed for interpretation of S's talk is called here presupposed information and denoted by Ck.
In case of direct expressions, H has to construct S's presupposed information to identify which object S wants to refer to. A reference succeeds, when H can identify what S intended to refer to, i.e. when H can properly combine the given information with his own belif system.
Many sentences are semantically incomplete in the sense that they do not provide enough information to determine their truth values; Frege said that such sentences express incomplete thoughts (cf. Frege 1918/19) . Infomation given by these sentences can be combined with presupposed information; H supplements the literal information with his own beliefs, and this activity can be seen as the interpretation required for understanding.
Consider the meaning of the sentence "We drank three bottles of beer". This sentence does not provide precise information about who are referred to by the pronoun "we", and if it is used in a collective or distributive sense. When the sentence is interpreted in a collective sense, it can be translated as the set K1 of D-formulas (see (5)). Let d, be S's belief concerning people whom S wanted to refer to by the pronoun "we". In this case, this sentence is interpreted as follows by giving discourse information K1 and presupposed information C1; explanations are given in square brackets:
We drank three bottles of beer. [d5=d3(d2) and any animal-type part of d5 have a bad time, where d3(d2) means the donkeys that at least one of the farmers, i.e. d2, own. The axiom MA4 justifies this use of d3(d2).]
Elworthy (1995) and Krifka (1996) point out difficulties in the treatment of plural anaphora in Kamp and Reyle (1993) and propose their own semantic theories to overcome them. Both theories are purely semantical and no inference system is defined. NRL is a theory based on the standard two-sorted logic that has a complete inference system; we do not need to define any new inference systems. Furthermore, NRL can handle not only plural anaphora but also "mass anaphora", as was shown in this section.
6. Conclusion Kamp and Reyle (1993) discussed the problem of plural anaphora. They attempted to combine DRT (discourse representation theory), GQT (generalized quantifier theory), and algebraic semantics in Link (1983) . Recently, Link (1998) proposed an algebraic semantics for plural entities, mass objects, and events. This paper is closely connected with these two works. As in Link (1998) , I argued that the mereological approach provides a proper ontology for the semantics of plural and mass terms.
The central theses of this paper are: 1. materials and the part-whole relation among them are ontologically fundamental; 2. things are individuated by using sortal predicates.
A two-sorted theory NRL is defined and Skolem symbols are used to express anaphoric relations. A straightforward combination of mereological ontology and dynamic semantics is shown. Nakayama (1997 Nakayama ( , 1998b proposes how NRL can be extended to a system of hypothetical reasoning that can capture knowledge representation and nonmonotonic reasoning in AI.
A mereological ontology is incomplete without analysis of events and processes.
This remains as a future work. 
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